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Abstract: An IBE (identity-based encryption) technique is a very valuable implement in cryptography and have numerous potential 
applications. The security of conventional IBE technique entirely relies on upon the protection of private keys. Disclosure of private 
keys wants reissuing all beforehand assigned encryptions. This confinement turns out to be more evident nowadays as key 
disclosure is more basic with expanding utilization of mobile and unprotected devices. Under this foundation, justifying the damage 
of key disclosure in IBE is a critical issue. To manage this issue, we plan to participate advancing safety into IBE. In this article, 
we present a new development of IBE technique that is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attack (IND-ID-CCA) in 
random oracle model. 
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1. Introduction  
An IBE (identity-based encryption) technique is a one of public key encryption component, where a subjective 
string, for example, the beneficiary's identity, can function as same public key. This comfort eliminates the essential 
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to appropriate public key declarations. Then again, in ordinary public key encryption technique, it is unavoidable to 
get to the online public key index with a specific end goal to acquire people in public keys. IBE technique are to a 
great extent inspired by numerous applications, for example encrypting messages with the beneficiary's email address. 
Shamir18 presented the ideas of ID-based cryptography (IBC) to streamline the certificate management in email system 
in 1984. In IBC, the unmistakeable identities of a client is utilized as the general the public key, while the secrete key 
connected with that identities is processed and issued covertly to client by a trusted outsider named Private Key 
Generator (PKG). In such formal setting the main thing that ought to be certificated is the public constraints of the 
PKG, so IBC definitely decreases the requirement for declarations. In 2001 Cocks5 and Boneh and Franklin3 presented 
two IBE techniques, individually. In their other article4, Boneh and Franklin utilized a class of bilinear maps as the 
premise of their development. This has prompted various IBE techniques1, 2, 19, among others, which depend on bilinear 
maps. 
The first efficient probably secure IBE technique was presented by Boneh and Franklin3, 4. The novel methodology 
they utilized depends on a class of bilinear maps. Taking after their work, various of IBE technique utilizing bilinear 
maps were projected. For instance, Boneh and Boyen1 planned a protected IBE techniques without random oracles. 
After Waters19 introduced an effective and protected IBE technique without random oracles, Boneh and Boyen2 
contributed additional effective IBE technique without random oracles, which is safe in the selective identity model. 
In any case, as piercing out in7, even the effective technique similar3 are still altogether slower than general public key 
cryptosystems such as ElGamal. Interestingly, our IBE technique is practically as quick as the ElGamal in encryption 
and decryption phases.  Meshram et al.8-10 presented some new efficient IBE technique and ID-based mechanisms 
based on discrete logarithm (DL), generalized discrete logarithm (GDL) and factoring. The security of this techniques 
are solving the hardness of DL, GDL and factoring simultaneously. Meshram and Meshram11, 12 investigate the new 
variants of ID-based beta cryptographic technique and transformation process such as public key cryptographic 
technique transfer to ID-based cryptographic technique without developing new ID-based technique. Meshram13-15 
presented new provably secure ID-based cryptographic technique, new variant of ID-based beta cryptographic 
technique, and efficient technique based on factoring and DL. It is as low as ElGamal technique. Recentaly Meshram 
and Obaidat16 also showed new variant of ID-based cryptographic technique such as quadratic-exponentiation 
randomized cryptographic technique. 
As outlined in the above, we presented IBE technique and verified a formal security proof for semantically secure 
against IND-ID-CCA under the PDL suspicion in the random oracle utilizing the reversing technique presented by 
Boneh and Franklin4.  
    The rest of this article is organized as fellows. Required background material is introduced in Section 2. Our efficient 
IBE technique based on PDL is presented in Section 3. The consistency of algorithm is explained in Section 4. Security 
investigation of new technique is discussed in Section 5. Lastly, Section 6 concludes the article. 
2. Background and Material  
2.1. Mathematical assumption 
    The security of our technique will be reduced to the complexity of the Partial Discrete Logarithm (PDL) issue in 
the group in which the signature is developed. We quickly survey the definition 6, 17 
The Partial Discrete Logarithm (PDL) 
   Let ܰ ൌ ँऀ be a number, with ँ and ऀ are primes of the structure andँ ൌ ʹँǯ ൅ ͳand ऀ ൌ ʹऀǯ ൅ ͳ, whereँǯ 
and ऀǯ are also primes. We indicate by ܵሺκሻ the arrangements of prime numbers of length κ. We consider ਽ ൌ ܴܳேమ  
the cyclic group of quadratic residues modulo ܰଶ. We have ݋ݎ݀ሺ਽ሻ ൌ ఒ൫ே
మ൯
ଶ ൌ ऀऀ
ᇱँँᇱ ൌ ேఒሺேሻଶ ǡ with ߣሺܰሻ ൌ ʹँԢऀԢ. 
The maximal order of a component in this group is 
ேఒሺேሻ
ଶ , and each component of order ܰ is of the form ߙ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ ݇ܰሻǤ 
Definition 1 (PDL):  Let ԭ  be a component of maximal order in ਽ . For straightforwardness, we assume that 
ԭఒሺேሻ݉݋݀ܰଶ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ ܰሻ݉݋݀ܰଶ , that is ݇ ൌ ͳ . For given ԭ  and ݖ ൌ ԭ௪݉݋݀ܰଶ  (for few  ݓ א ሾͳǡ ݋ሺ਽ሻሿ , 
Paillier19 defined the PDL as the computational issue of computing ݓሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ. We anticipate this issue is difficult, 
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as stated in the accompanying suspicion. 
Assumption 1 (PDL over ࣴேమכ ). For each probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm ि, there exists a negligible 
function ݈݊݁݃ሺሻ such that for adequately extensive ݐ. 
 ቂिሺܰǡ ԭǡ ݖሻ ൌ ܽሺ݉݋݀ܰሻȁँǡ ऀ ՚ ܵܲ ቀ௧ଶቁ Ǣ ܰ ൌ ँऀǢ ԭ ՚ ਽Ǣ ܽ ՚ ሾͳǡ ݋ݎ݀ሺܩሻሿǢ ݖ ՚ ԭ
௔ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻቃ ൌ ሺݐሻ  
3. Proposed IBE Technique  
     In this section, we proposed an IBE technique. It contains the following four components 
3.1. Setup 
       By taking in security parameterሺࣽǡ ݐሻ, this process will be done by PKG as follows: 
a. Select two huge prime numbers ँ and ऀ such that ܰ ൌ ँऀ and let ਽ be a multiple group of maximal order 
with generator ԭ such that ਽ ك ࣴேమכ Ǥ 
b. Generate ݐdimension secret vectors ܼ ൌ  ሺऊଵǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ऊ௧ሻ, where ऊ௜ is randomly selected from ࣴேכ . 
c. Generate the corresponding ݐ  dimension public vectors ܺ ൌ  ሺईଵǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ई௧ሻǡ where ई௜ ൌ ԭऊ೔ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ  and 
݅ א  ሺͳǡ ݐሻ. 
d. Construct hash function ԰ଵ ׷  ሼͲǡ ͳሽכ ՜ ሼͲǡ ͳሽ௧. 
e. Construct two functions such that ԰ଶ ׷ ਽ ՜ ሼͲǡ ͳሽκǡ ԰ଷ ׷ ਽ ൈ ሼͲǡ ͳሽκ ՜ ࣴேమכ  
The master key of PKG is a set to be ݉݇ ൌ  ሼܰǡ ܼሽ  and the public parameters of PKG are ݌݉ ൌ
ሼܩǡ ԭǡ ݐǡ ܺǡ ԰ଵǡ ԰ଶǡ ԰ଷሽ.  
3.2. Extract 
    For a given ࣻࣸ א  ሼͲǡ ͳሽכ, the process executes the next: 
a.  Compute ԰ଵሺࣻࣸሻ ՜ ሺࣺଵǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ࣺ௧ሻ and assume that ࣺ௜ is the ݅௧௛ bit of ԰ଵሺࣻࣸሻ, where ݅ א  ሺͳǡ ݐሻ. 
b. Calculate the secrete key as takes after: 
ऊࣻࣸ ൌ෍ࣺ௜ऊ௜
௧
௜ୀଵ
ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ 
c. Calculate the comparing public key as takes after: 
 
ईࣻࣸ ൌ ς ሺݕ௜ሻࣺ೔௧௜ୀଵ ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ ൌ ς ሺԭ௜ሻࣺ೔ऊ೔௧௜ୀଵ ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ ൌ ԭऊࣻࣸሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ. 
3.3. Encryption 
        A message ࣾ א  ሼͲǡ ͳሽכ is encrypted for ࣻࣸ as takes after: 
a. Select arbitrary value ݎ א ࣴேכ and compute 
ܥଵ ൌ ݎईࣻࣸ԰యሺ௥ǡࣾሻሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻǤ 
b. Compute ܥଶ ൌ ԭ԰యሺ௥ǡࣾሻሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ. 
c. Compute ܥଷ ൌ ࣾ۩԰ଶሺݎሻሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ 
         The cipertext is set by ܥ ൌ  ሺܥଵǡ ܥଶǡ ܥଷሻǤ 
3.4.  Decryption 
   To decrypt the ciphertext ࡯ under clients identity ࣻࣸ, the user can decrypt ܥ using his private key ऊࣻࣸ as follows: 
ܥଷ۩԰ଶ ቆ
ܥଵ
ܥଶ
ऊࣻࣸቇ ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ 
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4. Consistency of the algorithm  
For the correctness of above process, we have  
ܥଷ۩԰ଶ ቆ
ܥଵ
ܥଶ
ऊࣻࣸ ቇ ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ ൌ  ܥଷ۩԰ଶ ቆ
ݎݕࣻࣸ԰యሺ௥ǡࣾሻ
ሺԭ԰యሺ௥ǡࣾሻሻऊࣻࣸቇ ሺ݉݋݀ܰ
ଶሻ ൌ  ܥଷ۩԰ଶ ቆ
ݎሺԭऊࣻࣸሻ԰యሺ௥ǡெሻ
ሺԭ԰యሺ௥ǡࣾሻሻऊࣻࣸ ቇ ሺ݉݋݀ܰ
ଶሻ
ൌ  ܥଷ۩԰ଶ ቆ
ݎ݃ऊࣻࣸ԰యሺ௥ǡࣾሻ
ԭ԰యሺ௥ǡࣾሻ௫ࣻࣸ ቇ ሺ݉݋݀ܰ
ଶሻ ൌ ܥଷ۩԰ଶሺݎሻሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ ൌ ࣾሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ 
5. Security analysis and discussion 
    In this area, we demonstrated the security of IBE technique is semantically secure against IND-ID-CCA in the 
random oracle, utilizing the reversing procedure presented by Boneh and Franklin4. 
Theorem 1. Let hash functions԰ଵ be random oracle, then our IBE technique is ሺࣽ଴ǡ ࣽଵǡ ߳ሻ-semantically protected 
against IND-ID-CCA under the decisional ሺͳ െ ᐯሻ߳ሺࣽሻ in the random oracle. 
Proof. Expect that there occurs a ሺࣽ଴ǡ ࣽଵǡ ߳ሻ IND-ID-CCA foe ृ against IBE techniqueǤWe build an IND-CCA 
algorithm  to perform the IND-CCA game with the challenger to disruption the encryption technique. To get a good 
advantage, ि simulates the IND-ID-CCA challenger to perform an IND-ID-CCA game with the foe ृ. We give a 
detailed description takes after. 
Setup: suppose thatࣽ ൌ ࣽ଴ ൅ࣽଵ. Algorithm ि acquires the public constraints ሺܩǡ ܰǡ ԭǡ ԰ଵǡ ԰ଶሻ and public key 
ܣ ൌ ԭ௔ of the encryption technique from the challenger. Algorithm ि arbitrarily selects ݒଵǡ ݒଶǡ ݒଷǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݒ௧ א ࣴேכ  and 
ሺࣽ ൅ ͳሻ݊ -dimensional binary vectors ௜ܸ ൌ ሺࣺଵ௜ǡ ࣺଶ௜ǡ ࣺଷ௜ǡ ǥǥ ǡࣺ௧௜ሻ்  , where ݅ א  ሺͳǡ ࣽሻ  is uniform and 
independent. The main contrast is that ि replaces the zero vector in the right side of Equation (1) with ଵܷ ൌ
ሺͳǡ ǥ Ǥ ǡͳᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ࣽభାଵ
ǡ Ͳǡ ǥ Ǥ ǡͲᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ࣽబ
ሻ் . ि arbitrarily selects ݑଵǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݑ௧ א ࣴேכ  fulfilling the accompanying mathematical statements 
framework: 
ሺଵǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ୲ሻ ൮
ࣺଵଵ ࣺଵଶ
ࣺଶଵ ࣺଶଶ
ࣺଵଷ ǥǥǥ ࣺଵࣽ
ࣺଶଷ ǥǥǥ ࣺଶࣽ
ڭ ڭ
ࣺ୲ଵ ࣺ୲ଶ
ڭ ǥǥǥ ڭ
ࣺ୲ଷ ǥǥǥ ࣺ୲ࣽ
൲ ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ ൌ ሺͲǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡͲሻሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ ൌ Ͳ                    (1)           
                                                                                                                                     
and  
      ሺଵǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ୲ሻ ൮
ࣺଵଵ ࣺଵଶ
ࣺଶଵ ࣺଶଶ
ࣺଵଷ ǥǥǥ ࣺଵࣽ
ࣺଶଷ ǥǥǥ ࣺଶࣽ
ڭ ڭ
ࣺ୲ଵ ࣺ୲ଶ
ڭ ǥǥǥ ڭ
ࣺ୲ଷ ǥǥǥ ࣺ୲ࣽ
൲ ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ ൌ ଵ்ܷሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ                                  (2)           
Assuming no ሺݑଵǡ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݑ௧ሻ fulfills the Equation (2), then   aborts. The algorithm ि arbitrarily selects one of them. At 
that point ि sets the public parameter ܺ and corresponding master private key is given by ܼ as takes after separately  
ܺ ൌ ሺܣ௨భԭ௩భǡ ǥ ǡ ܣ௨೟ԭ௩೟ሻሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ, ܼ ൌ ሺܽݑଵ ൅ ݒଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܽݑ௞ ൅ ݒ௞ሻሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ 
Note that ि doesn’t know ܽ. Algorithm ि provides the public constraints ሺܩǡ ܰǡ ԭǡ ݐǡ ܺǡ ԰ଵǡ ԰ଶሻ  to the foe ृ. 
Random Oracle Inquiries:  The foe ृ requirements to make inquiries to the random oracle ԰ଵ when he needs to get 
hash values. Such inquiries can be made in any of the remaining stages of the IND-ID-CCA game. ि answers random 
oracle inquiries as takes after. 
       Despite everything we accept that ݍ԰భ  is a polynomial upper bound of the quantity of random oracle inquiries. ि 
arbitrarily selects ߤଵǡ ߤଶ ك  ൫ͳǡ ʹǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ԰ܰభ൯freely such that  ȁߤଵȁൌ ࣽ଴ǡ ȁߤଶȁ ൌ ࣽଵ ൅ ͳ . 
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       To reply the random oracle inquiries, ि keeps up a list ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧ ൌۃࣻࣸ௜ǡ ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻǡ ߙ௜ۄ, where ࣻࣸ௜ is an identity that 
has performed in the before random oracle inquiries and ߙ௜ א ሼͲǡ ͳǡ ʹሽ is assigned when ि reacts to the inquiry. Let 
԰ଵ௅௜௦௧  denote this list of tuples; toward the starting, ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧ is vacant. At the point when there is a random oracle inquiry 
ࣻࣸ௜, ि reacts as takes after: 
1. If ࣻࣸ௜ is previously in list ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧ , then ि  answers with the noted hash value ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻ. 
2. If ࣻࣸ௜ is the ݅Ԣ th new inquiry to the random oracle and ݅ᇱ א ߤଶ െ ߤଵ, and ݅Ԣ is the ̶݅th smallest component in ߤଶ െ
ߤଵ; then ि sets ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻ ൌ  ሺࣺଵ௜̶ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ࣺ௧௜̶ሻ  and ߙ௜ ൌ ʹ. ि answers to ृ with ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻ and records the tuple 
ۃࣻࣸ௜ǡ ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻǡ ߙ௜ۄ in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧ . 
3. If ࣻࣸ௜ is the ݅Ԣth new inquiry to the random oracle and ݅ᇱ א ߤଵ, ݅Ԣ is the ̶݅th smallest component in ߤଵ and that 
݆ ൌ ࣽଵ ൅ ̶݅; then ि sets ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻ ൌ  ሺࣺଵ௝ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ࣺ௧௝ሻand ߙ௜ ൌ ͳ. At that point ि answers to ृ with ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻ and 
records the tuple ۃࣻࣸ௜ǡ ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻǡ ߙ௜ۄ in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧ . 
4. Something else, ि arbitrarily selects a binary string ࣺଵ௟ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ࣺ௧௟ א ሼͲǡ ͳሽ௧  that is not in the list ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧ , sets 
԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻ ൌ ࣺଵ௟ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ࣺ௧௟  and ߙ௜ ൌ Ͳ . At that point ि answers to ृ with ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻ  and records the tuple 
ۃࣻࣸ௜ǡ ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻǡ ߙ௜ۄ in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧ . 
Stage 1: Private key extraction inquiries. For each private key extraction inquiry ࣻࣸ௜ issued by the foe ृ, algorithm 
ि reacts as takes after: 
1. In the event that ࣻࣸ௜ performs  in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧ andߙ௜ ് ʹ, or ࣻࣸ௜  doesn’t perform in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧ and all the ௝ܸ created in the 
Setup stage have been utilized in answering the earlier inquiries, then the ि restarts the IND-ID-CCA game; in 
specifically, ि  requirements to re-select the set ߤ ك  ሺͳǡ ʹǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ԰ܰభሻ in the resumed game. Letter that ि can 
restart the IND-ID-CCA game at most ሺܥே԰భ
ࣽାଵ െ ͳሻ times. Uncertainty the time of resuming the IND-ID-CCA 
game surpasses this quantity, then ि aborts, yielding a consistently arbitrary bit as ߪԢ.  
2. If ࣻࣸ௜ performs in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧  and ߙ௜ ൌ ʹ, then ि computes ऊࣻࣸ೔ ൌ σ ࣺः௜ᇱ௧ःୀଵ ݒः and answers with ऊࣻࣸ೔ , where ࣺः௜ᇱ  is 
the ः௧௛ bit of recorded value ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻ . 
3. If ࣻࣸ௜  doesn’t perform in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧  and there exists ௝ܸ  produced in the Setup stage that was never utilized in 
answering the part inquiries, then ि selects such a never used ௝ܸ  , sets ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻ ൌ ࣺଵ௝ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ࣺ௧௝  and ߙ௜ ൌ ʹ, 
answers the inquiry using ऊࣻࣸ೔ ൌ σ ࣺः௜௧ःୀଵ ݒः, and records the tuple ۃࣻࣸ௜ǡ ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻǡ ߙ௜ۄ in ԰ଵ
௅௜௦௧ . 
Note that: 
ऊࣻࣸ೔ ൌ ෍ ࣺः௜
௧
ःୀଵ
ݔःሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ ൌ ෍ ࣺः௜
௧
௦ୀଵ
ሺܽݑः ൅ ݒःሻሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ 
ൌ ܽ෍ ࣺः௜
௧
ःୀଵ
ݑःሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ ൅෍ ࣺः௜
௧
ःୀଵ
ݒःሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ ൌ෍ ࣺः௜
௧
ःୀଵ
ݒःሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ 
where the previous expression  is because of Eq.(1). So the overhead task of ऊࣻࣸ೔  is legitimate. 
Ciphertext inquiries. For each ciphertext inquiry ۃࣻࣸ௜ǡ ܥ௜ۄ issued by the foe  , where ܥ௜ ൌ  ሺܥଵǡ ܥଶǡ ܥଷሻ, then ि 
answers as takes after: 
1. In the event that ࣻࣸ௜performs  in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧  and ߙ௜ ൌ Ͳ, or ࣻࣸ௜ doesn’t perform in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧ and all the ௝ܸ ǡ ሺͳ ൑ ݆ ൑
ࣽଵሻ,  produced in the Setup stage have been utilized as a part of answering to the past inquiries, then  ि restarts 
the IND-ID-CCA game; specifically, ि needs to re-select the sets ߤଵ and ߤଶ in resumed game. Letter that ि can 
resume the IND-ID- CCA game at most ሺܥே԰భ
ࣽାଵ െ ͳሻtimes. Uncertainty the time of resuming the IND-ID-CCA 
game surpasses this number, then ि aborts, yielding a consistently arbitrary bit. 
2. If ࣻࣸ௜ performs in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧  and ߙ௜ ൌ ͳ, then ि calculates the private key ऊࣻࣸ೔ . At that point   decrypts ܥ௜ using ऊࣻࣸ೔  
and answers to ृ using the plaintext. 
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3. If ࣻࣸ௜ performs  in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧  and ߙ௜ ൌ ʹ, then ि develops ܥ௜ᇱ ൌ  ሺܥଵܥଶି௩ǡ ܥଶǡ ܥଷሻ where ݒ ൌ σ ࣺ௟௜ᇱ௧௟ୀଵ ݒ௟ , and ࣺ௟௜ᇱ  is 
the ݈th bit of the recorded value ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻ.  
Then ि issues ܥ௜ᇱ to challenger as a ciphertext inquiry and straight on the response of the challenger back to ृ. 
4. If ࣻࣸ௜  doesn’t perform in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧  and there exists ௝ܸ ǡ ሺͳ ൑ ݆ ൑ ࣽଵሻ, created in the Setup stage which never 
performed in the past inquiries, then ि selects such a ௝ܸ and sets ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻ ൌ ࣺଵ௝ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ࣺ௧௝ and ߙ௜ ൌ ʹ. At that 
point ि develops ܥ௜ᇱ ൌ  ሺܥଵܥଶି௩ǡ ܥଶǡ ܥଷሻǢ where ݒ ൌ σ ࣺ௟௜ᇱ௧௟ୀଵ ݒ௟ .  
The algorithm   issues ܥ௜ᇱ  to the challenger as a ciphertext inquiry and forwards the answer of the challenger back to 
ृ. The algorithm ि records the tuple ۃࣻࣸ௜ǡ ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௜ሻǡ ߙ௜ۄ in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧. 
Note that, if ߙ௜ ൌ ʹ, then by Equation (2) we have ݑ ൌ ͳ. So: 
ݎईࣻࣸ೔
ः ሺԭःሻି௩ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ ൌ ݎሺԭ௔௨ା௩ሻःሺԭःሻି௩ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ ൌ ݎሺԭ௔ሻःሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ 
Hence, the above developments of ܥᇱ is legitimate. 
Challenge: The foe ृ submits two plaintexts ࣾ଴ǡࣾଵ א ሼͲǡ ͳሽκ and an identity ࣻࣸ௖௛ that doesn’t equal any ࣻࣸ௜ 
performed in the private key extraction inquiries. The algorithm ि reacts as takes after: 
1. If ࣻࣸ௖௛ performs in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧  and ߙ௜ ൌ Ͳ, then the ि restarts the IND-ID-CCA game; specifically, the ि re-selects 
the sets ߤଵ and ߤଶ in the restarted game. Review that ि can restart at most ሺܥ௤԰భ
௞ାଵ െ ͳሻ times. Uncertainty the time 
of resuming the IND-ID-CCA game surpasses this quantity, then the ि aborts, yielding a consistently random bit. 
2. If ࣻࣸ௖௛ performs in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧  and ߙ௜ ൌ ʹ, then the ि submits ሺࣾ଴ǡࣾଵሻ to the challenger. Assume that challenger 
sends back a challenge ሺܥଵǡ ܥଶǡ ܥଷሻ. At that point ि sends ሺܥଵܥଶ௩ǡ ܥଶǡ ܥଷሻ to ृ as a challenge. 
3. If ࣻࣸ௖௛ doesn’t perform in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧, then the ि sets ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௖௛ሻ ൌ ࣺଵ଴ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ࣺ௧଴. At that point ि records the tuple 
ۃࣻࣸ௖௛ǡ ԰ଵሺࣻࣸ௖௛ሻǡ Ͳۄ in ԰ଵ௅௜௦௧ and submits ሺࣾ଴ǡࣾଵሻ  to the challenger. Assume that the challenger sends back a 
challenge ሺܥଵǡ ܥଶǡ ܥଷሻ. Generally as in the past case, the ि sends ሺܥଵܥଶ௩ǡ ܥଶǡ ܥଷሻ to ृ as a challenge. 
 Stage 2:  ि reacts to the private key extraction inquiries and ciphertext inquiries similarly as in Stage 1. 
Guess: ि forwards the yield of the foe ृ to the challenger as his own particular yield. 
   Obviously conditional probability that the algorithm ि gains the IND-CCA game when the ि doesn’t abort is equal 
to the probability that ृ wins the IND-ID-CCA game. Thus, we just need to bound the probability that ि doesn’t 
abort. There are three reasons that cause the ि aborts (a) In Stage 1 or Stage 2, a private key extraction inquiry prompts 
resume the IND-ID-CCA game but the times of resuming surpasses ܥே԰భ
ࣽାଵ െ ͳǤ (b) In Stage 1 or Stage 2, a decryption 
inquiry prompts resume the IND-ID-CCA game but the times of resuming surpasses ܥே԰భ
ࣽାଵ െ ͳǤ (c) In the challenge 
stage, the challenge prompts resume the IND-ID-CCA game but the times of resuming surpasses ܥே԰భ
ࣽାଵ െ ͳǤ 
Claim: The total probability are most  ଵఊ  ǡ
ଵ
ఊ ,ʹ
௞ି௧
 when ि is aborts for reason first, second and third respectively 
Proof. For the first reason with one selection ofߤ, the probability that there is a secrete key extraction inquiry 
prompting resuming of the IND-ID-CCA game is at most ቆͳ െ  ଵ஼ಿ԰భ
ࣽశభቇǤ  Suppose that  ݌଴ ൌ ܥே԰భ
ࣽబ ǡ and ݌ ൌ ܥே԰భ
ࣽାଵ, then, 
the probability that ݌ choices of ߤଵ all initiate to resuming of the IND-ID-CCA game is at most ቀͳ െ 
ଵ
௣బ
ቁ
௣
ൎ  ଵఊ .  
Also for the second reason, suppose݌ଵ ൌ ܥே԰భ
ࣽభାଵ, then the probability that ݌ choices of ߤଶ all initiate resuming of the 
IND-ID-CCA game is at most  ቀͳ െ  ଵ௣భቁ
௣
ൎ  ଵఊ .  
For the third reason, we consider the circumstance that the binary vector ܸᇱ ൌ ሺࣺԢଵǡ ǥ ǡ ࣺԢ௧ሻ் is a linear combination 
of ௝ܸሺͳ ൑ ݆ ൑ ݐሻǤ observing the matrix, ܯ௧ሺࣽାଵሻ ൌ ሺܸᇱଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܸᇱࣽǡ ܸԢሻ  where ࣽ ൅ ͳ ൑ ݐ , it is a linear combination 
matrix in the above circumstance. Assume the rank of this matrix ܯ௧ሺࣽାଵሻ is Ԣ , where ݐԢ ൑ ࣽ. That is, there exist ݐԢ 
row of ܯ௧ሺࣽାଵሻ that are linearly independent. Without loss of sweeping statement, assume that the first ݐԢ row of 
ܯ௧ሺࣽାଵሻ  are linearly independent. Also, let ܯ௧ᇲ௧ᇲ  indicate the ݐᇱ -dimensional vector containing of the ݐԢ  linearly 
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independent components of ௝ܸ Ǥ  So we have ȁܯ௧ᇲ௧ᇲȁ ൑ ʹ௧
ᇲ ൑ ʹࣽ. Subsequently there are absolutely ʹ௧ t-dimensional 
binary vectors, the probability that the   aborts for ܸԢ is linear combination of ௝ܸሺͳ ൑ ݆ ൑ ݐሻ is ʹࣽି௧ሺࣽ ൏ ݐሻǤ That is, 
the total probability that the   aborts for the first, second and third reason are most ᐯ ൌ ቀଵఊ ൅
ଵ
ఊ ൅ ʹ
ࣽି௧ቁǤ  
     In conclusion, the probability that ि doesn’t abort during simulation are at least ሺͳ െ ᐯሻǤTherefore the advantages 
that ि wins the IND-CCA game is at least ሺͳ െ ᐯሻ߳ሺࣽሻǤ explicitly, the advantage that ृ wins the IND-ID-CCA game 
is at least ሺͳ െ ᐯሻ߳ሺࣽሻ.This finishes the evidence of Theorem 1. 
6. Conclusion 
In this article, we planned an efficient IBE technique using PDL. Its unforgeability can be decreased to the 
complexity of the PDL, which is a essential obstinate issue in field of cryptography. IBE technique is semantically 
secure against IND-ID-CCA under PDL assumption in random oracle model. It is easy to see that our presented IBE 
technique requires that ࣽ ൏ ݐ, i.e., that the complete quantity of private key extraction inquiries ought to be not as 
much as ݐ. A fascinating open inquiry is whether we can outline an IBE technique that has similar effectiveness, but 
doesn’t require ࣽ ൏ ݐ. 
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